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GAME OVER: A PROPOSAL TO REFORM  
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 609 
Edward Roslak ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609 creates a dilemma for criminal de-
fendants who have previously been convicted of other crimes.1  
Should the defendant choose to take the stand and testify, Rule 609 
subjects him to the strong possibility of impeachment with evidence 
of his previous convictions, ostensibly to taint the jury’s evaluation of 
the defendant’s testimonial credibility.2  Rule 609 thus creates a zero-
sum game in which a criminal defendant must weigh his choice of 
whether to testify and tell his story against the likelihood that he may 
be impeached with evidence of his prior convictions.  Knowledge of a 
defendant’s prior convictions exposes the jury to three distinct temp-
tations to convict the defendant for a reason other than the jury’s be-
lief beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
charged offense.  First, a juror armed with knowledge of a defen-
dant’s prior crimes could be tempted to punish the defendant again 
for his prior offenses and not for the charged crime.3  Second, a juror 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2004, Bing-
hamton University.  The author would like to express his thanks to Professor D. Mi-
chael Risinger for all of his help. 
 1 Specifically, the Rule provides that 
[f]or the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness of a wit-
ness, (1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been con-
victed of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the 
law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an ac-
cused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence out-
weighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and (2) evidence that any 
witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted regardless of 
the punishment, if it readily can be determined that establishing the 
elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishon-
esty or false statement by the witness. 
FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
 2 See, e.g., Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884). 
 3 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 357 (1795). 
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may also be tempted by the knowledge of the defendant’s prior con-
victions to convict the defendant simply because of the view that he is 
a “bad man” and should be removed from society.4  Third, a juror 
may use the prior conviction information to infer that the defendant 
possesses a propensity to commit a crime—an inference specifically 
prohibited by Rule 404.5  A criminal defendant who would otherwise 
testify may instead choose not to take the stand specifically to prevent 
the jury from being exposed to evidence of his prior crimes.  Thus, 
the potential for impeachment can result in fewer criminal defen-
dants taking the stand with the concomitant loss of their ability to tell 
the jury their story in their own words. 
Although defendants impeached under Rule 609 are normally 
entitled to the issuance of a limiting instruction to the jury,6 empiri-
cal studies have called into question the actual value of these limiting 
jury instructions.7  Knowledge of prior convictions invites jurors to 
make inferences beyond the scope of those permitted by Rule 609,8 
and this invitation is likely too often accepted.9  Practitioners have 
come to note that “if you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can’t 
instruct the jury not to smell it.”10  Defendants have also taken no-
tice—defendants with records of prior convictions do not testify as of-
ten as defendants without them.11  By remaining off the stand, defen-
dants substantially increase the probability that a jury will not hear of 
 4 See, e.g., Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 
YALE L.J. 763, 763 (1961). 
 5 FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity there-
with.”). 
 6 When evidence of prior convictions is admitted for impeachment purposes 
under Rule 609, the defendant may request, and usually receives, an instruction to 
the jury limiting the use of the information for credibility purposes only.  1 EDWARD J. 
IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 1.03 (rev. ed. 1998). 
 7 Empirical research has called into question the jury’s ability to substantively 
follow limiting instructions and illuminates the likely misuse of prior misconduct evi-
dence for purposes other than credibility.  Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On 
the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on 
Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 42 (1985). 
 8 FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (allowing impeachment solely for the “purpose of attack-
ing the character for truthfulness of a witness”). 
 9 Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 44. 
 10 See, e.g., Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 886 (5th Cir. 1962). 
 11 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 146–47 (Little, Brown 
and Co., spec. ed. 1993) (1966). Defendants who do not have a criminal record elect 
not to testify in only nine percent of cases examined.  Id. at 146.  When the defen-
dant does have a record, twenty-six percent elect not to testify.  Id.  When the case for 
acquittal is strong, defendants without records elect to testify ninety percent of the 
time, compared with fifty-three percent for defendants with criminal records.  Id. 
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their prior criminal record.12  However, in criminal cases, the defen-
dant tends to be one of the best sources of available information, thus 
compounding the moral conundrum Rule 609 imposes upon our sys-
tem.13 
The American adversarial system depends on the parties to pro-
duce information.14  Thus, both parties view potential proffers of evi-
dence through the prism of partisan self-interest.  Absent necessity, a 
defendant’s belief that the fact-finder will utilize information in a 
manner not conducive to his self-interest could influence his decision 
to proffer the information.15  This partisan behavior directly impacts 
the information given to the ultimate fact-finder.16  When a criminal 
defendant with prior impeachable convictions decides to remain si-
lent due to fear of impeachment, Rule 609 in effect deprives the jury 
of hearing the defendant’s story and thus directly leads to a decline 
of useful, admissible information about the event in controversy.  
There must be a reconciliation between the system’s desire for the 
defendant’s testimony17 and the reality that should the defendant 
provide such testimony, impeachment will likely follow shortly there-
after.18 
Our historic acknowledgement that criminal defendants should 
be able to testify,19 the actual epistemic value of such testimony,20 and 
Rule 609’s effect on defendants—their likelihood to choose silence21-
—indicate that the Rule should be reformed.  This Comment ex-
plores the strategies available to the adversarial parties through the 
 12 Id. at 146–47.  A jury does not hear of a defendant’s prior record eighty-seven 
percent of the time when the defendant elects not to testify.  Id. at 147.  Should the 
defendant take the stand, the percentage falls to twenty-eight percent.  Id. 
 13 Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Im-
peachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1, 19 (1997). 
 14 In contrast, the inquisitorial model used on the European continent concen-
trates the information gathering process in the hands of the investigating magistrate.  
See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 77 (1997). 
 15 John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record—
Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 3 J. EMPIRICAL STUD. 477, 490–92 (2008). 
 16 See infra Part III. 
 17 See infra Part II. 
 18 See, e.g., Hornstein, supra note 13, at 17–18.  Although Rule 609 provides that 
the impeachment evidence be subjected to a balancing test before being admitted, 
admissibility tends to be the norm.  See id. at 20.  But see United States v. Footman, 33 
F. Supp. 2d 60, 61–63 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that defendant’s prior rape convic-
tion was inadmissible for impeachment purposes). 
 19 See infra Part II. 
 20 See infra Part II. 
 21 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 146–47. 
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lens of the zero-sum paradigm of game theory22 and proposes that 
evidence of prior convictions be made inadmissible for the purposes 
of impeaching a criminal defendant’s credibility.23  Part II charts the 
historical growth of a criminal defendant’s right to testify and intro-
duces the dilemma faced by criminal defendants with prior convic-
tions.  Part III further explores this dilemma with a focus on Rule 
609.  Part IV utilizes game theory to model the defendant’s dilemma 
of whether to testify under Rule 609.  Part V proposes to eliminate 
the dilemma by amending the Rule to disallow prior crimes im-
peachment against criminal defendants. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE GAME 
Evidentiary rules that governed what import the jury should 
grant to the impeachment of a defendant’s testimony did not exist at 
early common law because criminal defendants had no right to testify 
at all.24  The standard English punishment for the commission of a 
felony was death.25  Due to the prevalence of capital punishment, 
criminal defendants were deemed to have a strong incentive to lie 
under oath.26  This doctrine of interest held that “interested persons” 
were incompetent to testify.27  As all parties to an action were “inter-
ested,”28 the doctrine by definition prevented the testimony of crimi-
nal defendants.29  To compensate for the defendants’ incompetence 
 22 See, e.g., WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA: JOHN VON NEUMANN, GAME 
THEORY, AND THE PUZZLE OF THE BOMB 51–55 (1992). 
 23 See infra Part V. 
 24 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 65 (West Publ’g 
Co. 1954). 
 25 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *9. 
 26 See 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 350–55 
(London, MacMillan 1883); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370. 
 27 MCCORMICK, supra note 24, § 65. 
 28 This included parties to civil actions.  See, e.g., State v. Barrows, 76 Me. 401, 409 
(1884). 
 29 At early common law, trials could be resolved through compurgation.  JAMES 
BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 24–26 
(1898).  Parties obtaining groups of “oath-swearers” would have these “witnesses” 
swear to the veracity of the party’s sworn oath.  Id. at 25.  Thus, for example, in an 
action in debt 
the party who had to prove his case was to bring in ten men; five were 
set on one side and five on the other, and a knife was tossed up in the 
space between them.  The five towards whom the handle lay were then 
set aside; from the other five one was removed, and the remaining four 
took on the oath as compurgators. 
Id. at 26.  Whether a party could obtain the requisite number of people as compurga-
tors was the deciding factor.  See id. at 27–28.  The Norman Conquest brought with it 
the attempt of the Crown to consolidate its power; trial by compurgation was forbid-
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to testify under oath, they were granted the right to make an unsworn 
statement before the jury.30  The American colonies also practiced 
this English doctrine,31 and it remained in place following the Revo-
lution.
Although ostensibly designed to benefit the defendant, the un-
sworn statement had to be delivered without the aid of counsel and 
thus tended to be of little and uncertain value to the jury.33  It was 
uncommon for defendants, who had little understanding of the legal 
issues that confronted them, to give unsworn statements that would 
aid their legal case.34  Moreover, while the defendant could deliver 
the statement without fear of cross-examination, in some jurisdictions 
the prosecutor could present evidence in rebuttal, even otherwise 
impermissible evidence.35  Thus, the practical operation of the un-
sworn statement doctrine significantly impaired the defendant’s abil-
ity to tell his story to the fact-fin
By the early nineteenth century, the doctrine of interest came 
under attack,36 with reformers arguing that it prevented too much in-
den in the Assize of Clarendon in 1166.  Id. at 26.  The introduction of jury trial be-
fore the King’s judge was offered as an alternative to a trial by battle.  See id. at 26.  
The Crown’s justice system placed limits on the defendant’s trial options: “In treason 
and felony the accused could not have counsel; later, when witnesses could be had 
for the king, the accused could not have them; and still later, when he also could 
have them, his witnesses could not be sworn.”  Id. at 157.  By the founding of Amer-
ica, “all witnesses that have the use of their reason, [were] to be received and exam-
ined, except such as are infamous, or such as are interested in the event of the 
cause.”  3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *370.  “Infamy” referred to non-party wit-
nesses who had prior convictions for treason, crimen falsi, or any felony.  
MCCORMICK, supra note 24, § 64.  “Interest” referred to the interest the parties them-
selves had in the outcome.  Id. § 65. 
 30 See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 314 (1861).  A criminal defendant’s “right” 
to make an un-sworn statement before the fact-finder probably originated from the 
sixteenth-century necessity of having the defendant conduct his own defense.  See 
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 573 (1961). 
 31 See The King v. Lukens, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 5 (1762) (in which defendant moved to 
have himself sworn, but court denied motion because matter “must be proved by in-
different Witnesses”). 
 32 See Note, The Adoption of the Common Law, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 499, 499–500 
(1916). 
 33 Unsworn statement testimony would be taken for any value the jury wished to 
grant such a statement and in some jurisdictions was not even considered evidence.  
See Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 589. 
 34 See id. at 592–93. 
 35 See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 48 S.E.2d 865, 866–71 (Ga. 1948). 
 36 Bentham led the way by advocating the abolition of all exclusionary rules of 
evidence and allowing a system of “free-proof” to stand in its stead.  WILLIAM 
TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE 3 (1985). 
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formation from being put before the fact-finder.37  In the United 
States, the abrogation of the rules of interest for parties in civil trials 
came first,38 but, by the mid-nineteenth century, states also began to 
grant competency to criminal defendants.39  After witnessing these re-
forms in the United States, English commentator Sir James Stephen 
stated that he was 
convinced by much experience that questioning, or the power of 
giving evidence, is a positive assistance, and a highly important 
one, to innocent men, and I do not see why in the case of the 
guilty there need be any hardship about it. . . . 
     . . . . 
     . . . A poor and ill-advised man . . . is always liable to misappre-
hend the true nature of his defense, and might in many cases be 
saved from the consequences of his own ignorance or misfortune 
by being questioned as a witness.40 
The results impressed Stephen to such an extent that he 
changed his own position regarding the grant of competency to crim-
inal defendants in the late nineteenth century after years of advocat-
ing otherwise.41  These British observations of the trend to grant 
competency in America led Britain to do the same.42 
By the mid-twentieth century, Georgia was the last common law 
jurisdiction on earth to deny competency to criminal defendants.43  
The characteristics of the unsworn statement finally elicited action 
 37 The erosion took place first in England, followed by other common law juris-
dictions, including the United States.  James Bradley Thayer, A Chapter of Legal History 
in Massachusetts, 9 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10–12 (1895). 
 38 Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 576 n.5. 
 39 Individual states granted competency to criminal defendants to testify in the 
following years: Alabama, 1885; Alaska, 1899; Arizona, 1871; Arkansas, 1885; Califor-
nia, 1866; Colorado, 1872; Connecticut, 1867; Delaware, 1893; Florida, 1895; Hawaii, 
1876; Idaho, 1875; Illinois, 1874; Indiana, 1873; Iowa, 1878; Kansas, 1871; Kentucky, 
1886; Louisiana, 1886; Maine, 1864; Maryland, 1876; Massachusetts, 1866; Michigan, 
1881; Minnesota, 1868; Mississippi, 1882; Missouri, 1877; Montana, 1872; Nebraska, 
1873; Nevada, 1867; New Hampshire, 1869; New Jersey, 1871; New Mexico, 1880; 
New York, 1869; North Carolina, 1881; North Dakota, 1879; Ohio, 1867; Oklahoma, 
1890; Oregon, 1880; Pennsylvania, 1885; Rhode Island, 1871; South Carolina, 1866; 
South Dakota, 1879; Tennessee, 1887; Texas, 1889; Utah, 1878; Vermont, 1866; Vir-
ginia, 1886; Washington, 1871; West Virginia, 1881; Wisconsin, 1869; and Wyoming, 
1877.  Id. at 577 n.6.  In 1961, the Supreme Court of the United States mandated that 
Georgia also extend competency to criminal defendants.  Id. at 596. 
 40 STEPHEN, supra note 26, at 442–44. 
 41 Prior to the grant of competency, Stephen had argued that a criminal defen-
dant should not be extended competency to testify due to the pressure of being un-
truthful on the stand.  JAMES F. STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 185–88, 199–202 (Fred B. Rothman & Co., 2d ed. 1985) (1890). 
 42 See Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, §§ 1–7 (Eng.). 
 43 Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 570. 
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from the United States Supreme Court, which examined it beneath 
the umbrella of the more general right to counsel.44  The Supreme 
Court relied on the right to counsel to find that jurisdictions in the 
United States must allow defendants to have their statements elicited 
through the questioning of their lawyers.45  For example, in Ferguson 
v. Georgia,46 the defense counsel attempted to call the defendant, Fer-
guson, to testify at trial, only to be rebuffed by the trial judge.47  On 
appeal to the Supreme Court, Ferguson successfully argued that a 
failure to allow him to testify deprived him of the right to have his 
counsel elicit his statement from him, rather than delivering a state-
ment alone, without the aid of counsel.48 
The grant of competency to criminal defendants tended to be 
accompanied by the restriction and eventual abolition of the unsworn 
statement doctrine itself.49  Despite the obvious benefits, however, the 
demise of the unsworn statement doctrine also led to the dilemma 
faced by those with prior convictions.  In all American jurisdictions, 
from Ferguson onward, the defendant’s choice would be either to tes-
tify under oath or to remain silent.  In either case, a defendant would 
suffer the consequences of any unintended inferences that the jury 
might thereby establish.  The Supreme Court attempted to mitigate 
the potential harm caused by a defendant’s choice to remain silent by 
holding that, should a defendant choose silence, no comment by the 
court could work to create an inference of guilt.50  The Court further 
 44 Id. at 594–95. 
 45 Id. at 596. 
 46 365 U.S. 570 (1961). 
 47 Id. at 571. 
 48 Id. at 596.  Notably, the defendant argued for an extension of the Fourteenth 
Amendment not to cover the right to testify, but rather to have a right to counsel.  Id. 
at 601 (Clark, J., concurring).  In concurrence, Justice Clark noted that by accepting 
the defendant’s argument, the Court left open the possibility of the defendant mak-
ing an unsworn statement with the aid of counsel without being cross-examined.  Id. 
at 602. 
 49 Id. at 583–84, 587. 
 50 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).  Interestingly, the Court cited to 
the opinion in People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753 (Cal. 1965), which indicated that an 
inference of guilt may not be the only inference made by the jury should the defen-
dant choose to stay silent.  Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614–15.  According to the Court, the 
jury could also infer that the defendant chose to stay silent due to the pressure of 
prior conviction impeachment.  Id.  The Modesto court justified its ruling in part on 
the idea that there was no way to instruct the jury to disregard the prejudicial effect 
of a defendant’s refusal to testify.  Modesto, 398 P.2d at 761.  The Court’s reasoning in 
Griffin later found its way into the Federal Rules of Evidence, which states, for exam-
ple, that “[u]pon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse in-
ference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction that no inference may 
be drawn therefrom.”  FED. R. EVID. 513. 
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reinforced the goal of having the defendant testify by removing other 
common law barriers51 and extending the right to a defendant whose 
testimony included recollections achieved through hypnosis.52  In 
both instances, the Court referred to its decisions as a matter of fair-
ness to the defendant,53 and as a method of improving the epistemo-
logical value of the trial process.54 
The historical progression of the defendant’s ability to testify 
under oath illuminates several crucial aspects of the problem of Rule 
609 and impeachment.  There is an ever increasing desire to allow a 
defendant’s testimony into the trial arena.  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has come to accept that the defendant’s story is one of the 
most crucial pieces of information available to the fact-finder,55 and a 
need to provide a fair proceeding would seem to outweigh any linger-
ing concerns about the nature of the oath itself.  However, by en-
shrining the defendant’s constitutional ability to testify under oath 
with aid of counsel,56 the Supreme Court only reinforced the di-
lemma presented to defendants with prior convictions.  The choice of 
whether to testify may be created and reinforced as a constitutionally 
 51 Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612–13 (1972) (holding that the common-
law restriction which forced the defendant to choose whether or not to testify before 
calling any other witnesses violated the right to counsel).  The Court found that the 
restriction placed a “heavy burden on a defendant’s otherwise unconditional right to 
take the stand . . . .  The rule, in other words, cuts down on the privilege (to remain 
silent) by making its assertion costly.”  Id. at 610–11 (footnote omitted). 
 52 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 54–62 (1987). 
 53 Id. at 51; see Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612–13; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 
806, 819 n.15 (1975) (calling the right of the accused to testify one of the rights that 
“are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process”); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 
257, 273 (1948) (“A person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and 
an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in 
our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to ex-
amine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by coun-
sel.”). 
 54 Rock, 483 U.S. at 49–50; see Brooks, 406 U.S. at 609. 
 55 See Rock, 483 U.S. at 52. 
 56 Brooks, 406 U.S. at 611–12.  The Supreme Court was well aware of the dilemma 
faced by defendants. 
Pressuring the defendant to take the stand, by foreclosing later testi-
mony if he refuses, is not a constitutionally permissible means of ensur-
ing his honesty.  It fails to take into account the very real and legitimate 
concerns that might motivate a defendant to exercise his right of si-
lence.  And it may compel even a wholly truthful defendant, who might 
otherwise decline to testify for legitimate reasons, to subject himself to 
impeachment and cross-examination at a time when the strength of his 
other evidence is not yet clear. 
Id. 
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protected trial tactic in our adversarial system.57  However, the overall 
value of each tactical choice—to testify or to remain silent—is ques-
tionable.  Both of these choices provide admittedly negative conse-
quences to the defendant.58  Thus, while the Supreme Court ex-
tended and protected criminal defendants’ right to testify, it did not 
resolve the tactical dilemma this right poses defendants with prior 
convictions.  
Congress recognized the dilemma, at least in part.59  By passing 
Federal Rule 609, Congress sought to alleviate the burden placed 
upon defendants with prior convictions by imposing a balancing 
test.60  The current adoption of Federal Rule 609 is the result of a 
congressional compromise between the House, which promulgated a 
draft limiting the Rule’s application only to crimen falsi,61 and the 
Senate, which supported a version that expanded the use of the rule 
 57 See Rock, 483 U.S. at 52–55 (noting the criminal defendant’s constitutional 
right to testify in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments); see also Ferguson v. 
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 594 (1961) (establishing criminal defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to testify). 
 58 According to Justice Holmes, for example, 
[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the 
only ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is the gen-
eral readiness to do evil which the conviction may be supposed to show.  
It is from that general disposition alone that the jury is asked to infer a 
readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence that he has lied in 
fact.  The evidence has no tendency to prove that he was mistaken, but 
only that he has perjured himself, and it reaches that conclusion solely 
through the general proposition that he is of bad character and unwor-
thy of credit. 
Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884). 
 59 Federal Rule 609 specifically developed as a committee compromise: the 
House draft of the Rule sought to limit impeachment only to crimen falsi while the 
Senate draft would always admit such information.  Edward E. Gainor, Note, Charac-
ter Evidence by Any Other Name . . . : A Proposal to Limit Impeachment by Prior Conviction 
Under Rule 609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 762, 773–74 (1990).  In reaching a compro-
mise, Congress incorporated a balancing test and allowed impeachment for prior 
crimes involving felony subject to the judicial application of the test.  Id. at 775.  The 
House Judiciary Committee draft of Rule 609 limited the use of impeachment only to 
crimes involving “dishonesty or false statement.”  H.R. REP. No. 650, at 11 (1974), re-
printed in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat. 1926) 7075, 7093.  The Senate version of the 
draft would have allowed impeachment for any prior felony.  120 CONG. REC. 37,076 
(1974).  
 60 Rule 609(a) states that “evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a 
crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.”  FED. R. EVID. 609(a). 
 61 The term “crimen falsi” refers to “crimes of falsehood,” such as perjury.  See 
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (allowing for all prior conviction evidence to be admitted 
“regardless of the punishment, if it readily can be determined that establishing the 
elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false 
statement by the witness”). 
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to any felony.62  The compromise resulted in the adoption of a bal-
ancing test:63 felonies may be used for impeachment purposes if “the 
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.”64  Substantively then, 
Rule 609 allows the prosecutor to use evidence of prior convictions65 
to impeach a criminal defendant who chooses to testify, subject to the 
balancing test and the limitations of Rule 403.66 
Congress granted no guidance as to how to determine whether 
the probative value of a given piece of information outweighs its pre-
judicial effect; judges are instead left to apply the Rule individually, 
with all the variation judicial determinations entail.67  In general, trial 
judges applying this balancing test68 tend to find that the probative 
value of the prior conviction outweighs the prejudice that admitting 
the information imposes upon the defendant.69  Even in cases where 
the defendant’s prior conviction was for a similar crime—thus com-
 62 See Gainor, supra note 59, at 770–76 (offering detailed overview of history lead-
ing up to congressional compromise). 
 63 The balancing test is similar to that developed by the court in Luck v. United 
States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1964). 
 64 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
 65 The conviction must be for a crime the penalty of which is either death or im-
prisonment for greater than one year.  FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
 66 FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, 
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”). 
 67 See Roderick Surrat, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence: A Suggested Approach to Applying the “Balancing” Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 907, 929 (1980). 
 68 The position in which the balancing test places the judge demonstrates the 
American Adversary system’s trust in legal education and experience to provide the 
proper mental tools for differentiating bits and pieces of evidence, weighing them 
only according to the probative standard, and thereby producing a decision.  See 
DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 30.  In order to rule on a defendant’s motion in limine to 
exclude prejudicial impeachment information, the judge must first be told the pre-
judicial information and then—without it having a prejudicial effect on the judge—
rule on the information’s admissibility.  Id. at 50.  Given the judge’s position as a “re-
peat player” in the trial process, whether it is possible for the judge to provide the 
atomistic thought process necessary to make the required determination seems un-
likely.  See id. at 30; A. Leo Levin & Harold K. Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury 
Criminal Cases, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 905, 907 (1971); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie 
& Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Delib-
erately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1259 (2005); Note, Improper Evidence in 
Jury Trials: Basis for Reversal?, 79 HARV. L. REV. 407, 409 (1965). 
 69 Gainor, supra note 59, at 780 (noting that “the federal circuits give such great 
weight to the probative value of prior felony convictions that appellate panels are 
likely to uphold nearly any trial court decision to admit a prior felony conviction for 
impeachment—no matter how great the prejudice to the defendant”). 
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pounding the prejudicial value of a conviction with the temptation to 
use the information for the forbidden propensity inference70—courts 
have been willing to allow the information into the trial arena.71  To 
compensate for this admissibility of potentially prejudicial informa-
tion, the defendant may request a charge to the jurors limiting their 
consideration of this evidence to credibility only.72  However, the re-
medy may not be as reliable as envisioned—the actual effectiveness of 
the jury instructions is doubtful.73 
Ironically, the defendant with prior convictions is still penalized 
for having an “interest” in the outcome of the case.  Whereas previ-
ously the defendant was forced into silence,74 now the penalty is a 
choice between risks,75 with the possibility of a dangerous jury infer-
ence attached to either option.76  Since this choice is “voluntary,”77 
provided that there is adequate assistance of counsel,78 our adversar-
ial system regards the defendant’s choice in this matter as the appro-
priate framework for producing epistemically correct trial out-
III. THE CONTOURS OF THE GAME: APPLICATION OF RULE 609 
Although proponents of our criminal trial process generally de-
fend the system’s existence as a means of producing truthful80 out-
comes,81 other systemic concerns alter the equation.82  Our system re-
lies on two competing parties to bring information into the trial for 
 
 70 See id. 
 71 See Blume, supra note 15, at 483–86; see also Gainor, supra note 59, at 780. 
 72 FED. R. EVID. 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for 
one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admit-
ted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and in-
t’s guilt by his refusal 
 t es). 
). 
70, 596 (1961). 
al context, must mean the conviction of the 
ui t. 
e to the end that the truth may be ascertained 
nd
struct the jury accordingly.”). 
 73 See Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 43. 
 74 See, e.g., State v. Barrows, 76 Me. 401, 409 (1884). 
 75 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
 76 Id.  (noting that the jury may infer the criminal defendan
to estify, or by the fact that he was convicted of prior crim
 77 See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972
 78 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 5
 79 DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 74. 
 80 “Truthful,” especially in the crimin
g lty and the acquittal of the innocen
 81 DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 123. 
 82 FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in admini-
stration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth 
and development of the law of evidenc
a  proceedings justly determined.”). 
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servi
 the sword and shield of one party, the 
net a
innocence to the crime charged, what would there be to fear from 
 
evaluation by a judge83 and, due to this reliance, epistemic concerns 
often give way to questions of equity.  Both parties must feel that the 
process was fair.84  Public confidence in the judiciary system relies 
upon the parties’ perception that the judiciary is “committed to
ng notions of fairness, justice, and equality before the law.”85 
While the medieval trial by battle has been safely relegated to 
the halls of memory, the specter of two armed combatants sparring 
still lends itself as an analogy to our current trial process.86  This con-
flict between the parties, combined with the need for judges to play 
the role of neutral arbiter, leads to the development of exclusionary 
rules of evidence, such as Rule 609.87  Examined in this light, the ex-
clusionary rules exist in part to provide acceptable contours to the 
game88 being played by the parties.  The exclusionary rules, along 
with privileges and rights, form
nd trident of the other. 
If an adversarial criminal trial can be viewed as a game played 
between two parties, what are the stakes?  For the defendant, the 
avoidance of punishment provides a powerful incentive for making 
tactical choices which can enhance or dampen the “truth seeking” 
aspect of the trial.  For example, the jury might expect an innocent 
defendant to testify.  After all, if a criminal defendant maintains his 
 83 DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 122. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F. Supp. 1221, 1235 (D. Neb. 1995). 
 86 Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The State’s Right to a Fair Trial, 60 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1037 (1987). 
The classic view of the trial is that it is a “search for truth.”  In this view, 
the adversary system is a contest between equals.  The role of the pros-
ecutor is to obtain a conviction, while the role of the defense attorney 
is to obtain an acquittal.  If each carries out his role, then the truth will 
emerge.  The goal of this model is to arrive at an accurate result.  The 
search for truth model demands that the “scales must be eveuly [sic] 
held,” so that the parties may be equally armed for adversarial combat. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also D. Michael Risinger, John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn 
Old Chief, and “Legitimate Moral Force”:  Keeping the Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and 
Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 436–38 (1998). 
 87 See DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 84. 
 88 The Supreme Court has pointed out from time to time that criminal trials are 
not games.  See, e.g., Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1990).  However, it is diffi-
cult to otherwise conceive of a system in which two adversaries employ “tactics,” or 
strategies, in order to counter or thwart each other’s actions and achieve goals that 
are at cross-purposes with each other.  See Risinger, supra note 86, at 436–38.  The use 
of these tactics can affect the probative weight that the jury attaches to information 
exposed because of a tactical decision or to prejudicial evidence revealed by one.  See 
Risinger, supra note 86, at 438. 
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the addition of his side of the story?89  By testifying, the defendant in-
creases the pool of information available to the jury—information 
that the jury might require in order to make a finding of innocence.  
On the other hand, the factually guilty defendant can either risk the 
process of testifying and endure the cross-examination or choose to 
seek refuge behind a constitutional shield90 and remain silent.  More-
over, a factually guilty defendant who chooses silence likely does not 
add incorrect testimonial information for the jury to consider be-
cause he is not adding any testimonial evidence at all.  In either 
event, the defendant’s ability to choose whether to testify aids the 
court’s determination of guilt or innocence. 
For the prosecutor, the incentive is to see justice done by seek-
ing the conviction of the guilty.  A prosecutor who files frivolous 
charges against a defendant violates his ethical duty.91  Thus, in order 
to determine whether to bring criminal charges against a defendant, 
the prosecutor must first form a belief that the individual is guilty of 
the crime charged.  Therefore, it is unlikely that a prosecutor would 
file criminal charges against a defendant in the first instance if the 
prosecutor was not already convinced that the defendant was likely 
guilty of the crime charged.  From a perspective of omniscience, ethi-
cal prosecutors would bring charges against only factually guilty de-
fendants.  However, the common human constraint of finite knowl-
edge ensures that, occasionally, prosecutors will make mistakes and 
bring charges against factually innocent defendants.92  Regardless, 
once armed with a good faith belief that the defendant is guilty of the 
charged crime, a prosecutor will attempt to see justice done—mostly 
through obtaining convictions.  Like the defense, the prosecution’s 
role is not specifically to ensure an epistemically correct outcome 
from an omniscient perspective (the trial process itself creates this 
aura of rectitude), but rather to create the conditions through the 
adversary system to ensure what the prosecutor regards as the correct 
outcome. 
From this perspective, cross-examination, the tool recognized for 
its supposed epistemic value, can also be seen as a partisan weapon in 
an adversarial battle.  Impeachment of the defendant is one of the 
strongest aspects of cross-examination.  If the “truth-seeking” value of 
cross-examination exposes a factually guilty defendant to conviction, 
 89 Plenty, according to the Supreme Court.  See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 
605, 607–13 (1972). 
 90 E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 91 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2001). 
 92 See, e.g., Blume, supra note 15, at 490. 
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the system produces the correct outcome.  However, once convinced 
of the defendant’s guilt, to the eyes of the prosecutor, “the truth” will 
always be a guilty verdict.  In the case of a factually innocent defen-
dant, negative inferences the fact-finder may make that arise from 
cross-examination do not help the fact-finder reach the correct out-
come.  In the case of an innocent defendant, the cross-examination is 
more akin to a combatant’s weapon in the trial arena.  In light of this 
situation, systematic belief in the method of adversarial cross-
examination as being the “greatest engine ever invented for the dis-
covery of truth” should not be accepted without the qualification that 
the method is “almost equally powerful for the creation of false im-
pressions.”93 
Thus, when presented with a choice of strategies, both sides have 
a strong incentive to ensure not that the best kinds of information 
enter the trial arena, but rather that whatever information or lack 
thereof promotes the achievement of the party’s desired partisan 
outcome.94  As previously noted, the defendant’s desire is to avoid 
punishment; the prosecution’s desire is to see punishment meted 
out.  Both sides will use all of the tools at their disposal to realize 
these goals.  The defendant will or will not testify based upon his sub-
jective determination of the choice that benefits him more.  If the de-
fendant testifies, the prosecution will cross-examine.  If the defendant 
has prior convictions, the prosecution will seek to impeach the de-
fendant’s credibility.  Whether these decisions result in a trial proce-
dure that concludes with a “truthful” outcome is not necessarily as re-
levant to the parties as achieving their own goals.  Both guilty and 
innocent defendants alike desire acquittal. 
From the fact-finder’s perspective, only information which has 
positive epistemic value should be taken into consideration95 and, 
even then, considered only in regard to the methods that the system 
deems acceptable.96  Juries tend to infer several things from the de-
 93 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 8 (Tillers rev. 1983) (1940). 
 94 Damaška links this incentive with the growth of exclusionary rules, in order to 
“pressure the parties and their lawyers to make available the best or most reliable 
sources of information to the court.”  DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 84–85.  But see Gor-
don Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 403, 465 (1992) (asserting that exclusionary rules are developed as “the result of 
an active judiciary seeking to control the activities of law enforcement officials at the 
expense of achieving a reliable result in the judicial proceeding”).  However, if one 
counts the police and the prosecutor as the same “party,” exclusionary rules which 
developed through a desire to check the power of the police are also concerned with 
“equity” between the parties themselves and not the function of “truth-seeking.” 
 95 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401. 
 96 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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fendant’s choice of testimony or silence.97  First, although the prose-
cution cannot emphasize a negative inference from a defendant’s si-
lence as proof of guilt,98 the jury is capable of making negative infer-
ences on its own.99  Second, if the defendant chooses to testify, this 
testimony lies beneath a mantle of overall juror distrust, even under 
the best of circumstances.100  Impeachment with evidence of prior 
convictions should be a factor only in the juror’s evaluation of the ep-
istemic value of the defendant’s testimony; the judicial system incor-
porates the belief that this is its ostensible purpose.101  However, in 
the context of prior crimes credibility impeachment, the dangers of 
impeachment’s prejudicial usage are twofold: first, there exists a fear 
that the fact-finder will be tempted to make a “bad person”102 propen-
sity103 inference; second, there is a fear that the jury will overestimate 
its probative value.104 
The first concern speaks to the heart of whether an individual is 
capable of performing the kind of analysis that the law mandates.  
The law requires that jurors evaluate the information presented to 
them in an atomistic way.  In light of this mandate, the argument of 
an individual juror’s capability to process impeachment information 
has traditionally centered on whether one regards a human being’s 
analytical powers as performing primarily in an atomistic105 or a holis-
 97 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, 
at 41–42. 
 98 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. 
 99 Id. at 614 (“What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing.  
What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence 
against him is quite another”). 
 100 Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 41 (finding that “the credibility rating of the 
defendant was significantly lower than that of the other witnesses in each case”). 
 101 FED. R. EVID. 601(a). 
 102 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 6, § 1.03. 
 103 FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissi-
ble to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity there-
with.”). 
 104 See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 6, § 1.03. 
 105 DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 33–36. 
When jurors are told to use a piece of evidence for a narrow inferential 
purpose, the successful completion of this task often calls for sophisti-
cated mental operations.  Preventing one’s inference from overflowing 
into legally forbidden territory can even be a real psychological feat—if 
it is psychologically possible at all.  One of the most obvious examples is 
the demand that a defendant’s criminal record be used only as it af-
fects the credibility of his in-court testimony.  To prevent the ripple ef-
fects of this information from producing a broader probative impact 
on belief formation presupposes remarkable self-control and intellec-
tual delicacy.  Not much less sophistication is needed to consider an 
item of information only for the purpose of determining whether it was 
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tic106 manner.  Both models provide a theory as to how human be-
ings’ cognitive capacity weighs informatio
The atomistic models may be divided into probabilistic and non-
probabilistic models.108  Under the probabilistic version, a human be-
ing attaches probability values along a sliding scale to each individual 
piece of information under consideration.109  The non-probabilistic 
version proposes that human beings weigh information using a bi-
nary system.110  Under this version, human beings either believe a 
piece of information or not.111  Both of the atomistic models suppose 
that human beings have the capacity to consider individual pieces of 
information in isolation with broader themes.112  In contrast, the 
school of holistic thought supposes that people are unable to con-
sider pieces of information in isolation of broader concepts and in-
stead use narratives and stories to determine whether a piece of in-
formation is valid.113  The remedy for the inclusion of prejudicial 
information into the trial arena in the Rule 609 context is a limiting 
instruction to the jury.114  We count on these jury instructions, which 
suppose that the atomistic models represent juror decision making, 
to ensure that the juror cognitive process proceeds according to the 
manner endorsed by the law.115  This limiting instruction makes it 
plain that the prior conviction evidence the jury just heard should 
not sully their thinking outside of the limited context of whether the 
defendant was telling the truth under oath.  Thus, Rule 609 presup-
poses that an individual can grasp information of prior convictions 
and then apply this information in an atomistic manner if so directed 
by a limiting instruction. 
Whenever a single individual is responsible for hearing prejudi-
cial information, evaluating it, and then “excluding” it from the deci-
made (rather than also for its truth) or to employ a piece of informa-
tion only with regard to one of several joint charges arising from a sin-
gle event. 
Id. at 33.  Damaška borrows the term “atomism” from William Twining.  See id. at 35 
n.20. 
 106 See id. at 35. 
 107 See id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 35. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id.; see Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Mak-
ing: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 522 (1991). 
 114 FED. R. EVID. 105. 
 115 See DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 33–36. 
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sion-making process, as a judge must do in a bench trial,116 the sys-
tem’s assumption that human cognitive function corresponds to the 
atomistic model is on display.  Legal training117 and the judge’s ex-
perience on the bench118 are both said to aid judges particularly in 
applying exclusionary rules correctly and not drawing prejudicial 
“bad man” inferences from prior conviction evidence.119  Although 
“presumptions of propriety”120 help insulate a judge’s evidentiary rul-
ings in a bench trial from searching appellate review,121 cases do oc-
cur in which a judge fails to live up to the atomistic ideal in a fashion 
that is egregious enough to merit censure.122  If the judge, possessing 
specialized training and experience, is not immune from misusing 
propensity evidence, it stands to reason that the problem “is more 
persuasively explained by human cognitive imperfections, tout 
court.”123  In other words, the misuse of propensity evidence is part of 
a human being’s holistic cognitive functions and a weakness for 
which Rule 609 does not adequately compensate.  The propriety of 
evidentiary rules such as Rule 609 comes into doubt when we ac-
knowledge that some judges cannot perform the calculus required by 
law and that introduction of the information to a lay juror will likely 
invite a propensity inference.124  This criticism blends into the second 
“fear”: that the probative value of a prior conviction may be exagger-
ated by the 
Empirical studies have shown that juries who become aware of a 
criminal defendant’s prior criminal convictions tend to use that in-
formation and convict the accused more often than when a defen-
dant’s prior criminal convictions are not presented.126  One study, 
conducted by Professors Roselle Wissler and Michael Saks, involved 
 116 Levin & Cohen, supra note 68, at 906. 
 117 Id. at 905. 
 118 DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 30. 
 119 Absent these traits, there would be little separating a judge from a lay-juror, 
who is not trusted to perform the required calculus without instructions. 
 120 Levin & Cohen, supra note 68, at 907. 
 121 Id. 
 122 See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 271 A.2d 641, 644 (Md. 1970) (noting that 
“judges, being flesh and blood, are subject to the same emotions and human frailties 
as affect other members of the specie”); State v. Eugene, 536 N.W.2d 692, 696 (N.D. 
1995); Commonwealth v. Oglesby, 263 A.2d 419, 420 (Pa. 1970) (noting that trial 
judge’s finding in bench trial for guilt depended solely upon defendant’s prior crim-
inal record). 
 123 DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 32. 
 124 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 
U. PA. L. REV. 165, 185–88 (2006). 
 125 IMWINKELRIED, supra note 6, § 1.03. 
 126 Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 39–43. 
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presenting hypothetical fact patterns to individuals.127  The study util-
ized two different fact patterns, one in which the crime charged in-
volved auto theft, the other involving murder.128  The study’s partici-
pants agreed to read the materials and reach a verdict as if they were 
jurors.129  Each story was designed to have the defendant testify and 
leave the question of his guilt ambiguous.130  In the study, the fact pat-
tern was presented in one of four conditions: (1) non-use of the prior 
record information, (2) previous conviction for the charged crime, 
(3) previous conviction for a different crime, or (4) previous convic-
tion for perjury.131  In all instances where the fact pattern introduced 
information of the prior convictions, the individuals were given a lim-
iting instruction that the information was to be used only for assess-
ment of the witnesses’ credibility.132  Wissler and Saks theorized that if 
the prior conviction evidence was used correctly, the result would be 
most easily seen under the condition that provided for a prior convic-
tion for perjury.133 
Surprisingly, the results of the study indicated that credibility for 
the defendants in each condition was uniformly low.134  From a com-
monsense point of view, one would expect a juror to be skeptical of 
any defendant’s testimony, given the pressures placed upon that per-
son to have his story conform to his protestations of innocence.  
However, if jurors are not evaluating prior crimes evidence to assess 
credibility, what are they doing with it?  While credibility did not vary 
from each condition (the defendant’s was always the lowest of any 
witness), the results also showed that the conviction rates would vary 
in accordance with the existence and kind of prior conviction.135  The 
mean percentage rate for conviction under both the auto theft and 
murder versions was markedly higher when the participant read of a 
previous prior conviction.136  Although the study cautions about its 
 127 Id. at 40. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at 40–41. 
 130 Id. at 40. 
 131 Id. 
 132 The instruction given was a truncated version of an actual jury instruction used 
in Massachusetts.  Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 40 n.5. 
 133 Id. at 40. 
 134 Id. at 43 (“Indeed, the defendant’s credibility rating was dramatically and un-
varyingly the lowest of any of the witnesses. . . .  Mock jurors do not appear to be us-
ing evidence of prior convictions to assess the defendant’s credibility.”). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
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potential value to real-world scenarios,137 evidence also indicates that 
the situation is not much different in the real world.138 
Another study, conducted by Professor John Blume, focused on 
individuals who were wrongfully convicted and later exonerated by 
DNA evidence.139  In the cases examined, ninety-one percent of this 
class of factually innocent defendants that failed to testify had a prior 
conviction and, “[i]n almost all instances, counsel for the wrongfully 
convicted . . . indicated that avoiding impeachment was the principal 
reason the defendant did not take the stand.”140  In jurisdictions 
which did not allow impeachment, all of the defendants in this class 
testified.141  Despite the fact that these defendants were all factually 
innocent, the real-world fear of the probative value of their prior 
convictions being overestimated by the jury was a key motivating fac-
tor in their decision to remain silent.142 
IV. HOW IT ALL PLAYS OUT:  
WHITE, PAWN TO KING FOUR; BLACK, RESIGNS 
The pressures which the adversarial trial model impose upon the 
prosecution and defense lead inexorably to situations in which each 
side seeks to maximize its individual outcome.  If there are rational 
actors on both sides, each party will select a choice that it believes will 
lead to the highest possible partisan payoff, while exposing itself to 
the least possible risk.  When the criminal defendant examines im-
peachment with prior crimes evidence under Rule 609, he subjects 
his decision regarding whether to testify to this risk/reward calcu-
lus.143  While the prosecutor cannot control whether the defendant 
takes the stand, should the defendant choose to testify, the prosecu-
tor will decide whether to introduce evidence of the defendant’s 
prior convictions for impeachment purposes.  The prosecutor will al-
so examine this decision through the lens of partisan self-interest.144  
Thus, if a rational prosecutor who was seeking the conviction of the 
defendant believed that impeaching the defendant with prior crimes 
evidence would be detrimental to the prosecution’s case, the prose-
cutor would choose not to impeach.  Under that condition, im-
 137 Id. at 46. 
 138 Blume, supra note 15, at 490–92. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. at 18–19. 
 141 Id. at 19. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See, e.g., KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 144 See supra Part III. 
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peachment would reduce the state’s likelihood of prevailing and thus 
would be irrational.  The defendant’s choice of whether or not to tes-
tify, and the prosecution’s choice of whether or not to impeach 
should the defendant testify, creates a situation that may be reduced 
to a game theory model.145  The actions of both parties are completely 
predictable as a result of a two-player zero-sum “Minimax” game.146  
This partisan wrangling, however, does not take into consideration 
the epistemic price to be paid by the trial process as a whole.147 
A “game,” in this context, refers to a conflict between rational 
parties who each distrust the other.148  If the resolution of the conflict 
must result in only one of the two players achieving a fixed-sum 
goal,149 the “game” can be further described as “zero-sum.”150  A two-
player, zero-sum game will always result in one player’s gain and the 
other player’s proportionate loss.151  In the parlance of the game it-
self, the actual “points” which one gains or loses is referred to as “util-
ity.”152  Utility is the numerical representation of the actual, subjective 
preferences of each player.153  To illustrate this concept, suppose two 
people are playing a game of chess with a wager of one dollar bet 
upon the outcome.  Further suppose that each player’s motivation to 
play the game is simply the desire to win the dollar.  In this context, 
each player’s utility would be the subjective value that each player at-
taches to winning the game of chess.  Here, this value may be fairly 
characterized as the monetary amount due the winner of the game, 
or one dollar.154  In any two-player, zero-sum game, each player will 
attempt to maximize his or her subjective utility.155 
 145 The creation of game theory is generally attributed to John von Neumann.  
The theory itself is a method of approaching interest conflict between parties or 
“players.”  R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 2 (1957). 
 146 POUNDSTONE, supra note 22, at 7. 
 147 See infra Part V. 
 148 POUNDSTONE, supra note 22, at 39. 
 149 Id. at 51 (“The best example is a game like poker, where players put money in 
the pot, and someone wins it. . . . It is in this restricted but quite diverse category of 
games that game theory has enjoyed its greatest success.”). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 145, at 4. 
 154 POUNDSTONE, supra note 22, at 51 (“In a game played for money, money is util-
ity or nearly so.  When a game is played just to win, the mere fact of winning confers 
utility.”). 
 155 See id. at 51. 
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As another example, suppose a conflict situation arises in which 
two siblings, Elizabeth and Harry, argue over a bar of candy.156  Their 
mother approaches and mandates that Elizabeth break the bar into 
two portions.  However, the mother allows Harry to choose which of 
the two pieces to take for his own once the bar is split.  Each child de-
fines his or her subjective utility as possession of the largest piece of 
candy possible.  Elizabeth would thus appear to have an incentive to 
divide the bar into unequal portions.  However, the fact that Harry 
would have the first choice of piece limits that option; Harry would 
also prefer to have a larger share, and thus would be certain to use 
his choice to obtain the larger piece.  To achieve her maximum 
amount of individual utility, Elizabeth must break the bar into por-
tions that are as equal as possible.  The results of this game can also 
be represented in tabular format: 
 
 Harry’s Strategies 
Pick larger Pick Smaller 
Elizabeth’s Strategies 
Make unequal pieces 
Receive Smaller 
Piece 
Receive Larger 
Piece 
Make equal pieces Receive Equal Piece Receive Equal Piece 
 
Elizabeth chooses first whether to break the candy bar into rela-
tively equal or unequal portions.  Harry then chooses to pick either 
the larger or smaller piece.  The Minimax theorem stipulates that, 
when given a situation such as in this example, Elizabeth will always 
choose to break the bar equally, as Harry will always pick what he be-
lieves to be the larger piece.  Thus, the bottom left hand quadrant 
will always be the expected outcome of this particular game.  Al-
though there was an apparent sequence in each player’s turn (Eliza-
beth chooses first followed by Harry), because Elizabeth can figure 
out with certainty what Harry’s strategy would be,157 it is possible to 
conceive of this game as having simultaneous turns. 
Much as the initial brandishment of the candy bar sparked the 
strategic considerations of the children in the above hypothetical, the 
possibility of impeachment with prior-crimes evidence in a criminal 
trial compels opposing parties to consider their strategic options.  
Their analyses can likewise find expression as a two-person Minimax 
game.  Here, both the prosecution and the defendant are players in 
this trial arena.  The defendant’s tactical decision is to choose be-
 
 156 For a similar example, see id. at 52; see also LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 145, at 71. 
 157 See POUNDSTONE, supra note 22, at 54. 
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tween taking the stand and testifying or remaining silent.  The prose-
cutor’s decision is whether to impeach the defendant’s credibility 
with evidence of the defendant’s prior crimes.  In this game, each 
party would define its individual utility as adding information for the 
fact-finder’s consideration that, in the aggregate, best serves its side of 
the case.158  Only one of the parties may ultimately prevail at trial; the 
fact-finder will either convict or acquit the defendant.159  Thus, this 
game also falls under the zero-sum paradigm. 
The defendant first chooses whether or not to testify.  If the defen-
dant chooses to testify, the prosecution chooses whether or not to 
impeach the defendant’s credibility through the introduction of 
prior crimes evidence under Rule 609.  The choices of both players 
will result in different kinds and amounts of information presented to 
the jury.  Should the defendant choose to testify, his testimonial in-
formation will be admitted for the fact-finder’s consideration.  This 
information will include any information which comes out in cross-
examination and any information learned because of impeachment.  
Should the defendant choose not to testify, no new information is 
added to the arena.  However, the jurors are likely left wondering why 
the “innocent” defendant chose not to testify.160  Much like Elizabeth 
in the hypothetical example above, who understood that Harry would 
seek to obtain as big a piece of candy as possible, rational criminal 
defense counsel knows that the impeachment mechanism and the in-
troduction of evidence of the defendant’s prior crimes maximizes the 
prosecution’s utility.161  Thus, the players of this impeachment game 
can likewise be conceived as choosing their strategies simultaneously.  
Similar to the candy-bar hypothetical, this prior crimes impeachment 
game may be represented graphically: 
 158 See supra Part III. 
 159 Plea bargains and other settlement agreements are beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
 160 Although the prosecution may no longer ask the jury to draw a negative infer-
ence from the defendant’s failure to testify, the jury may nevertheless come to a simi-
lar conclusion on their own.  See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
 161 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 146–47. 
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 Prosecution’s Strategies 
Impeach Do Not Impeach 
Defense Strategies 
Testify 
Testimony & prior 
conviction 
information 
Testimony  
information only 
Remains Silent Jury presented with a 
silent defendant 
Jury presented with a 
silent defendant 
 
The Minimax “solution” for the defense will be the choice which 
offers the highest amount of utility to the defendant while granting 
the least possible amount of utility to the prosecution.  Empirically, 
the solution to the game is again the bottom left quadrant162 because 
the addition of impeachment information provides greater utility to 
the prosecution163 than the introduction of the defendant’s testimony 
provides to the defendant.  While the defendant’s direct testimony 
will expose the jury to information favorable to his side of the argu-
ment, the risk of cross-examination and impeachment with evidence 
of prior crimes obviates any advantage gained thereby.164  Therefore, 
even the factually innocent criminal defendant whose prior record 
includes impeachable offenses should always refrain from testifying if 
at all possible. 
V. CHANGING THE GAME 
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence aim to achieve several 
purposes,165 the current Rule 609(a) is remarkable for not satisfying 
any of these goals when the defendant has a record of felony or cri-
men falsi convictions.  While the defendant possesses a choice of 
whether to testify, the rational outcome of that choice is silence.166  
This outcome reduces—does not add to—the information available 
to the trier of fact.  Juries,167 and in some cases judges,168 are likely to 
 
 162 Id.; see Blume, supra note 15, at 483–85. 
 163 Greater utility here means the negative inferences juries draw from the im-
peachment.  See, e.g., Blume, supra note 15, at 487–88. 
 164 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 11, at 146–47 (noting that defendants with 
prior convictions chose to testify less often than defendants without a prior criminal 
record); see also Blume, supra note 15, at 490–91. 
 165 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of 
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be as-
certained and proceedings justly determined.”). 
 166 See supra Part IV. 
 167 See Blume, supra note 15, at 487–88. 
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give substantial probative weight to the prior conviction evidence.  
They are likely to hold prior conviction evidence admissible on the 
one hand, and a valid indicator of a propensity to commit crimes on 
the other.  Fearing the fact-finder’s likely drawing of these inferences 
from the introduction of the prior conviction information, defense 
counsel’s tactical response is to prevent the information from reach-
ing the fact-finder by keeping his client from testifying at all.  Despite 
the fact that our system purports to value the defendant’s testi-
mony,169 the actions of the opposing parties control the information 
available to the trial court.170  Rule 609 works to undo the right to tes-
tify accorded to the defendant since the unsworn statement doctrine 
was swept away in Ferguson.171  As the Court then stated, in justifying a 
criminal defendant’s right to testify, any other outcome would result 
in “the right to be heard by counsel [to be] of little worth.”172  Thus, 
the availability of prior crimes impeachment under Rule 609 does not 
result in the optimum epistemic outcome when applied to a criminal 
defendant’s choice of whether to testify.173  Jury instructions cannot 
wash away the harm the defendant incurs by testifying and being sub-
ject to the impeachment.174  Worse, the roots of this harm rest in the 
jury’s likely adoption of inferences that the law expressly seeks to pre-
vent,175 such as an inference that the defendant possesses a propensity 
to commit crime.  As an accused should not be convicted simply be-
cause of prior bad acts, reform of Rule 609 is urgently needed.  Spe-
cifically, the Rule should be changed to disallow the use of prior con-
viction evidence for the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
testifying party. 
Whether in cases of prior felony or crimen falsi, prior conviction 
evidence should not be admissible for credibility impeachment.  
Some states have taken the lead in recognizing the disproportionate 
impact that their state versions of Rule 609 had upon the defendant’s 
right to testify.176  Montana has excluded prior conviction evidence 
 168 See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 271 A.2d 641, 644 (Md. 1970). 
 169 See supra Part II. 
 170 See supra Part III. 
 171 See generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (establishing the defen-
dant’s right to testify—as opposed to an unsworn statement—as a constitutional right 
that the states must provide). 
 172 Id. at 595 (citing Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954)). 
 173 See, e.g., Blume, supra note 15, at 490–91. 
 174 See, e.g., Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 38. 
 175 See FED. R. EVID. 404. 
 176 See HAW. REV. STAT § 626-1, RULE 609 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (2008); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-609 (2008).  But see Surrat, supra note 67, at 914 (noting 
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from its state version of Rule 609.177  The Supreme Court of Hawaii 
has likewise found that impeachment with prior felony convictions 
violates the due process clause of the Hawaii Constitution.178  The 
Kansas version of Rule 609 follows the Hawaiian model, denying the 
use of prior felony conviction evidence for a felony, but allowing its 
use in crimen falsi cases.179  Thus, the Rule 609 game faced by the two 
adversaries in these states differs greatly from the impeachment game 
of Federal Rule 609. 
Indeed, evidentiary rules which exclude evidence of the defen-
dant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes allow the parties 
to play a much different game than what Federal Rule 609 currently 
allows.180  A rebalancing of the risks and rewards of testifying by ex-
cluding prior conviction evidence for the impeachment of criminal 
defendants would provide an increased incentive for criminal defen-
dants to testify during their criminal trial.  Modifying Federal Rule 
609 to comport with the Montana model181 would result in a com-
pletely different Minimax game: 
that the movement of these states toward these positions has not resulted in the crea-
tion of an overall trend to do so in other jurisdictions). 
 177 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-609 (stating that “[f]or the purpose of attack-
ing the credibility of a witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a 
crime is not admissible”). 
 178 State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (Haw. 1971) (“[T]o convict a criminal de-
fendant where prior crimes have been introduced to impeach his credibility as a wit-
ness violates the accused’s constitutional right to testify in his own defense.”); see also 
Asato v. Furtado, 474 P.2d 288, 294–95 (Haw. 1970). 
We think that there are a great many criminal offenses the conviction 
of which has no bearing whatsoever upon the witness’ propensity for ly-
ing or truth-telling, and that such convictions ought not to be admitted 
for purposes of impeachment. . . .  This is true not only of minor of-
fenses like parking tickets or . . . running red lights, but also of some 
major offenses like murder or assault and battery.  It is hard to see any 
rational connection between, say, a crime of violence and the likeli-
hood that the witness will tell the truth. 
Id. at 294–95.  Note, however, that impeachment for prior convictions for crimen fal-
si is still acceptable in Hawaii.  HAW. REV. STAT § 626-1. 
 179 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421. 
 180 See supra Part IV. 
 181 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-609. 
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 Prosecution’s Strategies 
Cross-Examination of 
Defendant’s Story 
No Cross Examina-
tion of Defendant 
Defense Strategies 
Testify 
Defendant testifies 
and endures cross-
examination 
Testimony  
information only 
Remain Silent Jury presented with a 
silent defendant 
Jury presented with a 
silent defendant 
 
Under this game model, the criminal defendant need not con-
sider the effect of his prior convictions when deciding whether to tes-
tify.  Restricting the prosecutor from impeaching the defendant with 
prior conviction evidence refocuses the choices of both parties.  The 
defense would first make a determination of whether the defendant’s 
recounting of his story provides greater benefit, in light of a prosecu-
tion’s cross-examination, than remaining silent.  The choice that best 
maximizes the prosecutor’s utility is to cross-examine the defendant, 
even without prior crimes impeachment.  If the defense concludes 
that the defendant’s case would benefit from testimony and cross-
examination, this game’s solution is the upper-left quadrant.  The 
prosecutor—restricted by a reformed Rule 609—would instead focus 
solely upon cross-examination of the defendant’s testimony at trial. 
Rebalancing this decision provides several epistemic benefits to 
the trial process.  First, stimulating the criminal defendant to testify 
with this proposed change would, on balance, bring more relevant 
information under the examination lens of the fact-finder.182  This 
added information would come from the defendant, a witness ac-
knowledged to be in the possession of information with special sig-
nificance to the proceeding.183  Under the current Rule 609, defen-
dants may refuse to testify merely due to fears of prior conviction 
impeachment.184  In the case of factually innocent defendants, this 
justified fear only serves to hinder the truth-seeking function of the 
trial process.  A survey of factually innocent defendants, who have lat-
er been exonerated through the introduction of DNA evidence,185 
indicates that they would have testified at their trial were it not for 
 
 182 See Blume, supra note 15, at 496–97. 
 183 Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987). 
 184 See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (quoting People v. Mo-
desto, 398 P.2d 753, 762–63 (Cal. 1965)); Blume, supra note 15, at 490–91. 
 185 Blume, supra note 15, at 491–92. 
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 not to testify. 
 
fear of impeachment with their prior crimes.186  Having these defen-
dants recount their version of the events at issue in their respective 
criminal trials could have increased the likelihood of an epistemo-
logically correct “not-guilty” trial verdict.  Moreover, the eventual ex-
oneration of these factually innocent criminal defendants indicates 
that any probative value the fact-finder may have ascribed to their 
prior convictions would have been illusory.  As the Supreme Court 
explicitly illuminated forty-seven years ago, the criminal defendant 
has a constitutional right to tell his story to the jury through the aid 
of his counsel.187  Reforming Rule 609 to exclude prior conviction 
impeachment would bolster this right to testify by allowing a broad 
class of defendants to consider only the risk of cross-examination 
when deciding whether or
Second, a prior conviction that meets the Rule 609 requirements 
for impeachment purposes is not necessarily probative for the pur-
poses of evaluating the defendant’s credibility.188  It is possible that an 
individual’s commission of certain offenses could work to enhance—
not reduce—his credibility under oath.  For example, consider the 
situation of an individual placed on trial for resisting conscription in-
to the armed forces.  In this example, the defendant morally objects 
to compulsory service in the military.  Rather than fleeing to a safe 
haven, he turns himself in, choosing instead to be tried and convicted 
for the offense of resisting the draft.  If he is arrested several years 
later and charged with a different crime, impeachment of his credi-
bility based upon that prior conviction would be illogical—the de-
fendant was so committed to telling the truth of his beliefs that he 
was willing to accept punishment for them.  Yet, under the current 
Rule 609, evidence of his prior conviction could nevertheless be used 
to taint his credibility in the eyes of the fact-finder.189  Reforming Rule 
 186 Id. 
 187 See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 595 (1961). 
 188 Blume, supra note 15, at 494–95.  The study performed by Wissler and Saks also 
indicates that the probative value of prior convictions on the defendant’s credibility 
is low in general.  Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 42. 
 189 Jeremy Bentham gave another example of this phenomenon.  2 JOHN HENRY 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 519 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) (1940) (citing 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, 
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 406 (Bowring ed. 1827)). 
Take homicide in the way of duelling [sic].  Two men quarrel; one of 
them calls the other a liar.  So highly does he prize the reputation of 
veracity, that, rather than suffer a stain to remain upon it, he deter-
mines to risk his life, challenges his adversary to fight, and kills him.  
Jurisprudence, in its sapience, knowing no difference between homi-
cide by consent, by which no other human being is put in fear—and 
homicide in pursuit of a scheme of highway robbery, of nocturnal 
housebreaking, by which every man who has a life is put in fear of it,—
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609 to forbid the use of prior conviction impeachment would avoid 
this epistemic pitfall. 
Third, it is difficult to analytically separate any probative value of 
a defendant’s prior conviction related to his credibility on the stand 
from a forbidden propensity inference.  The likelihood that the fact-
finder properly considers prior crimes impeachment evidence and 
applies it only toward evaluation of the defendant’s testimonial cre-
dibility is low.190  The criminal defendant’s credibility is already the 
lowest of any witness, due to the fact that he is a criminal defendant 
in the first place.191  Thus, although presumptively innocent, his status 
as a person charged with a crime likely taints the fact-finder’s initial 
approach to evaluating his testimony.192  When fact-finders become 
aware of a defendant’s prior record, they may use the information for 
an inappropriate purpose, either because of a belief that the informa-
tion is probative as to guilt or through a lowering of the standard of 
proof.  For example, jurors who believe that the defendant is a “bad” 
person due to prior criminal behavior may be more easily convinced 
as to the defendant’s guilt, or feel less of a need to carefully evaluate 
the case.193  Moreover, when the defendant’s prior convictions are for 
crimes similar to the offense for which he is currently on trial, the 
chance that the fact-finder will make these types of forbidden pro-
pensity inferences is even higher.194  In the case of prior convictions 
of crimen falsi, such as perjury, it is practically impossible to separate 
the proper impeachment use of prior crimen falsi conviction evi-
dence from an improper propensity usage.  For example, a fact-
finder could be expected to evaluate the testimonial credibility of a 
defendant with a prior conviction for perjury.  The proper considera-
tion of this prior conviction according to Rule 609 requires the fact-
has made the one and the other murder, and consequently felony.  
The man prefers death to the imputation of a lie,—and the inference 
of the law is, that he cannot open his mouth but lies will issue from it. 
Id. 
 190 See DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 32. 
 191 See Hornstein, supra note 13, at 15 (noting that “with respect to the credibility 
question, there is already substantial doubt about the defendant’s veracity arising 
from his or her interest in the outcome”). 
 192 Wissler & Saks, supra note 7, at 41, 43. 
 193 Id. at 44–45. 
 194 See, e.g., United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414, 418–19 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating 
that “[a]dmission of evidence of a similar offense often does little to impeach the 
credibility of a testifying defendant while undoubtedly prejudicing him”); Wissler & 
Saks, supra note 7, at 41–42 (“[D]efendants previously convicted of the same crime 
had a significantly higher conviction rate than defendants previously convicted of 
perjury or a dissimilar crime . . . .”). 
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finder to take into account that the prior conviction could affect the 
defendant’s testimony without making the forbidden inference that 
the defendant possesses a propensity to lie under oath.  Such atomis-
tic195 mental gymnastics do not likely take place in the minds of fact-
finders.196 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As long as prior-crimes impeachment under Rule 609 is in place, 
criminal prosecutors operate under a system that allows them to de-
cide both how to break the candy bar in two and which piece to 
take.197  The best method of rebalancing the risk and reward ratio be-
tween the defendant’s testimony and silence is to remove from con-
sideration the impediment that impeachment becomes and to modify 
Rule 609 accordingly.  Reforming Rule 609 in this manner would 
bring several epistemic benefits to the criminal trial process.  As play-
ers in the trial arena, each adversary currently understands that if 
prior crimes impeachment is available, the rational strategy for each 
party results in the withholding of particularly relevant information 
from the fact-finder’s consideration: the defendant’s story itself.  Re-
moving prior crimes impeachment would stimulate defendants to tes-
tify—particularly factually innocent defendants—while working to 
eliminate the possibility that the fact-finder misuses propensity infer-
ences. 
 195 See supra Part III. 
 196 DAMAŠKA, supra note 14, at 32. 
 197 Or, as Shakespeare’s Hermione said, 
Since what I am to say must be but that 
Which contradicts my accusation, and 
The testimony on my part no other 
But what comes from myself, it shall scare boot me 
To say ‘not guilty:’mine integrity, 
Being counted falsehood, shall, as I express it, 
Be so received. 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER’S TALE act 3, sc. 2. 
